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James Emanuel's avatar

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY

Two very interesting aspects to Berkshire at the moment that flow from this post that are worth throwing into the mix:

1/ Buffett is a huge fan of the methods of Henry Singleton, once having described him as the best capital allocator of all time. At the centre of Singleton's modus operandi was his use of stock as currency to acquire other businesses. He only did this when he viewed his stock as over valued because he was crystallizing the imaginary value created by the sentiment of the market, into tangible value by swapping the over valued stock for real assets. This is genius. Buffett has emulated this model over the course of his career, most notably with the acquisition of GenRe a couple of decades ago. So what does it tell us when Berkshire is sitting on a mountain of cash, approximately $250 billion, which could be used for acquisitions, but instead Buffett decides to use $1 billion in Class B stock to purchase the BHE shares owned by Walter Scott Jr? If nothing else, it certainly suggests that BHE is trading at a discount relative to the remainder of the Berkshire group. What else might it imply?

2/ Japanese companies have been stuck in a rut for years (see https://rockandturner.substack.com/p/japanese-equities-special-situation?utm_source=publication-search). Generally speaking, Japanese corporate management is mediocre at best, they hoard cash rather than reinvesting and so returns on capital decline steadily over time as earnings growth is slow while equity values climb rapidly. Some of these companies have a negative EV because their net cash position exceeds market cap. These are Benjamin Graham net/net businesses, but there's a catch - there has been no catalyst to unlock this trapped value, so why invest? This explains the depressed share prices and very low valuation multiples in Japan. To tackle this problem the Tokyo Stock Exchange in concert with the Japanese Government have introduced a raft of measures to unlock this trapped value - but I am not convinced that it will work. Mediocre management will remain in post and when a good business has mediocre management, it is the reputation of the management that prevails. The answer is for these companies to be acquired and for new owners to unlock that value. Berkshire would be ideal as an acquirer except that it has no presence in Japan and has no Japanese speakers in its senior management. So it has taken the next best approach. It owns about 9% of the five large Japanese trading houses (Mitsubishi Corp, Itochu Corp, Mitsui & Co, Sumitomo and Maurubeni Corp). These businesses, serial acquirers, are best placed to exploit this situation and as a major shareholder, Berkshire reaps the rewards. Better still, it has hedge the FX risk by issuing bonds in Japanese Yen to acquire the stakes - remember Japanese rates are almost zero, so why tie up capital? This means that its positions are leveraged to the point that returns are significantly magnified. This will be a huge catalyst for growth for Berkshire in the years ahead (just look at the annual rate of growth of these trading houses over the last 3, 5 or even 10 years - and that was before the raft of measures introduced by the Japanese government to boost corporate valuations. The fact that Berkshire is issuing more yen denominated debt reinforces this thesis. They are scaling into a long-term winning position with a huge tail wind.

Declaration: I am long Berkshire Hathaway

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